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EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-TORT ACTION AGAINST PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE AFTER EsTATE Is CLOSED-Plaintiff sustained personal injuries due to the negligent act of an employee in a business operated by defendant executor with court authorization. Eigl\.t months after the accident
occurred the assets of the estate were distributed and the executor discharged.
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Four months later the plaintiff instituted a suit for damages against defendant
in his individual capacity. Held, discharge of the executor did not relieve him
of personal liability for the tortious acts of his agent. Johnston v. Long, ( Cal.
1947) 180 P. (2d) 21, as modified on denial of rehearing 181 P. (2d) 645.
It is well established that an executor is personally liable for the torts of
agents and servants engaged in a business operated on, behalf of the estate. 1
When the probat~ court has jurisdiction over the decedent's estate and the
jurisdiction is properly invoked, a final decree of distribution or the discharge
of the personal representative usually serves to protect the representative who
acts in good faith under it against all claims connected with the estate. 2 In
the principal case the California Supreme Court declared that the closing of
,the decedent's estate did not operate to cut off the personal liability of an
executor for the torts of his agent. In support of such a view it may be argued
that since a personal representative operating tlie business of decedent is individually responsible for torts committed by his agents, in the same manner as
if he owned the business, the decree of distribution or representative's discharge
does not put an end to his tort liability.3 It is believed that most courts would
agree with such an argument, taking the position that a tort claim against the
personal representative is not in issue in the decree of distnoution and that the
legislature did not intend the statutes providing for discharge of the executor
or administrator to operate as a bar to liability of the representative for torts. 4
See comment, supra p. 645.
Cleaveland v. Draper, 194 Mass. n8, So N.E. 227 (1907); In re Coyne's
Estate, 103 Okla. 279, 229 P. 630 (1924); Togneri's Estate, 296 III. App. 33, 15
N.E. (2d) 908 (1938); 3 WoERNER, AMERICAN LAW OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d .ed.,
§§ 561 and 562 (i923); ATKINSON, WILLS, 745-748 (1937); 21 ,AM. JUR. 644.
8 Professor Bogert takes the position that a personal representative who carries on
the business of a decedent is a trustee. 3 BoGERT, TRUSTS, part 1, § 572 (1946).
To the effect that the personal representative is liable as if he owned the business: 2
ScoTr, TRUSTS, § 264 (1939); note 1, supra. The Missouri and Utah statutes on
the conclusiveness of decrees of distribution go about as far as any of the statutes ih
making the decree final. But even these statutes speak of the decree as conclusive
only as to p;irties interested in the estate. Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1942) § 230;
Utah Code (1943) § 102-12-9. For a compilation and analysis of statutes on conclusiveness of decrees of distribution see SIMES, MoDEL PROBATE CoDE 348-349
(1946). With the exception of two statutes referred to in note 5, infra, none of the
statutes on discharge of a personal representatiye appear to release him from personal
liability for acts committed while operating the decedent's business. Statutes relating
to discharge of the personal representative are considered in SIMES, MonEL PROBATE
ConE 365-366 (1946).
4 ROLLISON, WILLS 645 (1939). The principal case furnishes an example of
how a court may summarily dismiss a contention that discharge of the personal representative , relieves him from liability for torts, when there is ground for argument.
The California Probate Code provides, "Decree of discharge: When the estate has been
fully administered • • • the court must make a decree discharging him [ the personal
representative] from· all liability to be' incurred thereafter." Cal. Prob. Code Ann.
(Deering, 1944) § 1066. In Racouillat v. Requena, 36 Cal. 651 at 654-655 (1869),
the California Supreme Court stated that the statutory language "all liability to be
incurred thereafter" is superfluous and meaningless and the discharge of the personal
representative is unconditional. This decision was not cited in the principal case.
1
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There are statutes, however, which purport to make the discharge of the
executor or administrator absolutely final in every respect.'1 - It is conceivable
that these statutes would be construed so as to bar even tort claims against the
personal representative in his individual capacity. Failure on the part of the
injured party to present his claim or to institute suit within the nonclaim period
would probably not result in the action being defeated by the nonclaim statute~
The usual nonclaim statute contemplates the presentment of claims or demands
existing at the time of the debtor's death, or arising out of obligations incurred
by him while alive, and unless the statute provides otherwise, claims resulting ·
from the continuation of decedent's business are not barred. 6 The plaintiff
must, however, commence his action within the period of the general statute
of limitations.7 The personal representative is individually liable for the torts
of his agents even though the estate is insufficient to indemnify him. 8 Thus
the fact that there is no estate in existence would not of itself defeat a suit
by a party suffering from the tort of the representative's agent. But to interpret
the nonclaim statutes, statutes providing for discharge of executors and administrators, and decrees of distribution in such a manner that no notice of a tort
claim is required and that a representative is not released from personal liability
for torts of his agents when the estate has been distributed and the representative discharged would place the executor or administrator in an insecure position.
By unnecessarily delaying his suit until after distribution of the estate a tort
creditor could foreclose the chances of the personal representative's obtaining
reimbursement from the decedent's estate, and leave him with no more- than
a precarious claim against the distributees.9 On the other hand, an accident
15 The Alabama statute states that following a showing by the executor or administrator that all duties have been properly performed "the court must make a
judgment or decree discharging him from all liability as such executor or administrator." Ala. Code (1941) tit. 61, § 362. The Georgia Code provides that on
hearing of petition for discharge of administrator, if the ordinary is satisfied the
administrator has discharged his duties "the prayer of the petition shall be granted,
and the administrator released from all liability as such.••• " Ga. Code Ann. (1937)
§ II3-2302. See Clair v. Burke, 62 Ga. App. 607, 9 S.E. {2d) n9 (1940), to the
effect that the discharge of administrator relieves him of "all liability on account of
his administration."
6 Nealley's Appeal, IIO Me. 552, 88 A. 480 (1913); In re Kelly's Estate, 183
Wis. 485, 198 N.W. 280 (1924); ATKINSON, WILLS 654-655 (1937); 34 C.J.S.
742; 21 AM. JuR, 587.
7 Hewitt v. Beattie, 106 Conn. 602 at 617, 138 A. 795 (1927).
8 2 Scon, TRUSTS, § 265.4 (1939); 127 A.L.R. 687 (1940).
9 " • • • when he is the real party in interest the representative should secure a
refund, unless, indeed, he has paid [ distributees] with conscious disregard of a claim
due and payable or reasonably sure to become payable." Warren, "Proble~s in Probate
and Administration," 32 HARV, L. REv. 315 at 335 (1937). The REsTATEMENT
provides that a trustee is entitled to indemnity from the beneficiary to the extent of
property so conveyed "unless the beneficiary has so changed his position that it is
inequitable ,o compel him to indemnify the trustee." 1 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT,
§ 249(2) (1935). As to problems involved in obtaining recovery from distributees
after the estate is closed see: In re Strasenburgh's Estate, 148 Misc. 595, 266 N.Y.S.
634 (1933); Hewitt v. Beattie, 106 Conn. 602, 138 A. 795 (1927); 3 WOERNER,
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might occur shortly before the estate is distributed, and it would be unfair to
the tort creditor if his claim were barred by distribution of the estate and discharge of the personal representative. It is submitted that the fairest way to
handle this type of suit is to use a doctrine of laches-making delay on the
part of the plaintiff in instituting his suit without valid cause and to the prejudice
of the personal representative a good defense.

LeRoy H. Redfern, S.Ed.

AMERICAN LAw OF ADMINISTRATION, 3d ed., 1902, 1970 (1923); Simes, "Rights of
Creditors of a Decedent to Recover from Distributees after the Estate is Closed," 41
MICH. L. REV. 920 (1943); L.R.A. 1916A II85.

